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ACCIDENT COMPENSATION FOR AIRLINE
PASSENGERS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF




T HE FAILURE TO ATTAIN unanimous international
agreement on a universal maximum compensation
limit for airline accident victims has diluted the impact of
the Warsaw Convention.' To a large degree, the adop-
tion of a single maximum award,2 stated in terms of gold
* B. Com., 1964, McGill University; D.Phil, 1973, University of York. Mr. Ja-
cobs is an associate professor of economics at the University of South Carolina,
Columbia.
** B.A., 1961, Lenoir Rhyne College; Ph.D., 1965 Tulane University. Mr.
Kiker is professor of economics, University of South Carolina, Columbia.
See Cheng, Fifty Years of Warsaw Convention: Where Do We Go From Here? 28
ZEITSCHRIFr FUR LuFr- UND WELTRAUMRECHT 374-75 (1979).
2 The initial liability maximum was 125,000 francs. Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Warsaw Convention]. This sum was translated into international exchange as
8,300 Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs") (roughly equivalent to $7,885 American
dollars) in Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Convention for Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12
October 1929, ICAO Doc. No. 9145 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Addi-
tional Protocol No. 1]. This maximum amount was increased to 250,000 francs
(16,600 SDRs) by the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage By Air Signed at Warsaw on 12
October 1929, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 381 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hague Proto-
col] and to 100,000 SDR's by the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage By Air Signed at
Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on
28 September 1955, ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as Guatemala
City Protocol]. The SDR is a unit account used to express international prices and
values without referring to a national currency. The SDR's value is formed by a
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or an international currency, has raised many difficulties.
The attempt to define a commodity (such as gold) as a
universal standard has created confusion as to which value
to use when the value of the commodity has fluctuated.4
Additionally, inflation has eroded the value of each pro-
posed maximum limit; and while the maximum has in-
creased several times, such increases have been proposed
infrequently, and delays in implementation have resulted
in considerable lags in adjusting the maximum to rising
living costs and income levels. The inequitites in existing
maximums have been accompanied by challenges to these
maximums.5 Finally, international differences in earnings
(and hence losses due to accidents) between passengers
residing in different nations have rendered a single maxi-
mum unfair to the residents of wealthier nations.6
market basket of currencies of 16 trading nations. Each currency can be ex-
pressed in terms of the United States dollar, and an overall weighted average
value of all currencies forms the value of the SDR. See G. FEIGER & B.JACQUILLAT,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, 50-54 (1982). The value of the SDR in terms of the
United States dollar in February, 1985 was about 95 cents. Wall St. J., Feb. 25,
1985, at 46, col.7.
See Martin, The Price of Gold and the Varsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. 70, 72 (1979).
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1776 (1984).
In Franklin Mint, the Franklin Mint Corporation placed 714 pounds of coins on a
Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight from Philadelphia to London. The shipment
was lost, and Franklin Mini: sued TWA for $250,000. The court was called upon
to decide the proper conversion unit for converting the liability limitations of the
Warsaw Convention into United States currency. The Supreme Court held that
the proper conversion factor was the last official United States price of gold. Id. at
1784.
r See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir.
1982). In Bali, the plaintiffs argued that the Warsaw Convention's liability limita-
tions constituted an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of
law. Id. at 1309. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the liability limitations
constituted an impermissible travel restriction. Id. The Ninth Circuit, while stat-
ing that the plaintiffs arguments had some merit, concluded that these arguments
would fail if another remedy, such as a Fifth Amendment taking claim against the
United States, was available. Id. at 1310. See U.S. CONST. amend V. For a detailed
discussion of the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention liability limitations,
see Comment, Due Process, Equal Protection and the Right to Travel: Can Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention Stand up to these Constitutional Foes, 49 J. AIR L. & COM. 907
(1984); Comment, After Bali Can the HIarsaw Convention Be Proven a Taking Under the
Fifth Amendment, 49J. AIR L. & COM. 947 (1984).
4i See Sand, Air Carriers' Limitations of Liability and Air Passengers'Accident Compensa-
tion Under the lVarsaw Convention, 28J. AIR L. & COM. 260, 266 (1962). Sand states:
It must be admitted that efforts to set uniform amounts of recovery
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The primary purpose of this paper is to develop a pro-
posal in which compensation arrangements would be
brought more in line with actual economic losses. This
can be achieved without abandoning international agree-
ment altogether by the acceptance of a uniform procedure
by which all losses would be evaluated.7 A maximum
award, based on the distribution of actual estimated losses
and on a judgement of how many potential victims' de-
pendents would not receive full compensation by receiv-
ing the maximum award, could be formulated using the
proposed evaluation procedure. In addition to requiring
that all compensation regulations be related to actual
losses in an explicit manner, such a procedure would
avoid many difficulties related to changing currency and
gold values, inflation, and international income
difference.
I. BACKGROUND
In an effort to obtain uniform liability regulations
across nations, the drafters of the Warsaw Convention's
are in the borderland of feasible international unification. Although
the monetary value of 250,000 gold francs . . . may be the same in
all member countries, this standard does not take into account dif-
ferences in the national average income per capita which determines
the standards of damage compensation. Not only the so-called
under-developed countries, but also Western Europe lags far behind
the United States and Canada in this respect.
Id.
Both airlines and their insurance companies benefit from liability limitations
because their potential payout would be limited. If insurance premiums paid by
airlines are lower as a result of these limitations, airline passengers might benefit
from lower fares, to the extent that lower premiums are passed on to the passen-
gers. Additional benefits of an international agreement to travelers include
choice ofjurisdiction to plaintiffs, and the protection of citizens of signing coun-
tries before foreign courts. See Sand, supra note 6, at 266. According to the
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, an international system of
rules and practices in this area would "bring airlines around the world at least up
to the minimum level of compensation for loss of life, insure quick and reliable
recoveries (in most cases within six months) .... ." SENATE COMMITrEE ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, MONTREAL AVIATION PROTOCOLS Nos. 3 & 4, S. EXEC. REP. No. 1,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT ON MONTREAL
AVIATION PROTOCOLS].
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Article 228 proposed a universal limit on an international
airline carrier's maximum liability to international passen-
gers. 9 Article 23 of the Convention proposed the rule of
presumed fault on the part of the carriers,' 0 in the ab-
sence of carrier misconduct or negligence."I These limits
were widely accepted as evidenced by the number of
countries which have ratified, or agreed to adhere to, the
1929 Convention.
As real incomes have increased over time, the value of
the maximum liability has been deemed to be unaccept-
able.' 2 Accordingly, the proposed maximum limit was
doubled from the equivilent of 8,300 SDR's to 16,600
SDR's by amendments made in the Hague Protocol of
1955.'1 The United States has yet to accept this limit, or
the limit of 100,000 SDR's proposed in 1971 at Guate-
mala City.' 4 To avoid the denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention by the United States, an unofficial agreement
among international airlines serving the United States was
reached in 1966.15 By this private agreement, known as
the "Montreal Agreement," the airlines agreed to in-
creased Article 22 limits; they established a strict (i.e. the
carrier waives defense) liability limit of $75,000 gross of
legal fees ($58,000 net of legal fees) with prompt settle-
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22.
Article 22 provides: "In the Transportation of passengers the liability of the
carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs .... "
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22. Currently, 125,000 francs are roughly
equivalent to 8,300 SDRs. See supra note 2 for a discussion of SDRs.
m Article 23 provides: "Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability
or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this convention shall be null
and void .. " Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 23.
1 Article 25 provides: "The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his willful misconduct .. " Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25.
12 See Sand, supra note 6,'at 261; Cheng, supra note 1, at 374.
I See Hague Protocol, supra note 2, at 383.
14 See Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 2, at 8, art. XIV. See also Comment,
From Warsaw to Tenerife: Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limitations Imposed Pursu-
ant to the Warsaw Convention, 45J. AIR L. & CoM. 653, 672-77 (1980) (United States
has yet to adopt the provisions of the Hague Protocol or the Guatemala City
Protocol).
' SENATE REPORT ON MONTREAL AVIATION PROTOCOLS, supra note 7, at 3.
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ment dates specified.' 6 This agreement, however, does
not have the force of law.
One additional proposed set of arrangements has
emerged in the Warsaw Convention amendments. These
arrangements specifically allow domestic supplements to
be financed by "contributions from passengers," thus
serving as a mandated insurance system.' 7 One such sup-
plement has been proposed by the United States.'
II. AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ACCIDENT
VICTIM COMPENSATION
A. Valuing the Economic Loss
The basis of our approach to evaluating an economic
loss is that compensation for an accident is made for a loss
of economic value. Hence it is particularly appropriate in
the cases where deaths occur to determine the individuals
who lose the economic value.' 9 In addition to the most
16 Id.
17 Article 35a of the Guatemala City Protocol provides:
No provision contained in this Convention shall prevent a state from
establishing and operating within its territory a system to supple-
ment the compensation payable to claimants under the Convention
in respect of death, or personal injury, of passengers. Such a system
shall fulfill the following conditions: (a) it shall not in any circum-
stances impose upon the carrier, his servants or agents, any liability
in addition to that provided under this Convention; (b) it shall not
impose upon the carrier any financial or administrative burden other
than collecting in that State contributions from passengers if re-
quired to do so. ...
Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 2, art 35a.
1' A United States proposal for a domestic supplement compensation plan was
very much in the spirit of article 35a: "A domestic supplemental compensation
plan allowing for a total passenger liability limit of $320,000 ($200,000 in cover-
age in addition to the carrier's liability of $120,000 under the Protocol) was devel-
oped by the United States Government with Prudential Insurance Company as the
Contractor." See Senate Report on Montreal Aviation Protocols, supra note 7, at
3. The plan was approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board as an inter-carrier agree-
ment, pursuant to section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act, on July 20, 1977. Id.
See Aviation Protocols, 1977: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement of Alan Furgeson).
- The word "value" is relative, and if it is to have any meaning, not only must
the values be known, but also who loses the value must be known. See B. KIKER,
HUMAN CAPITAL: IN RETROSPECT 84-90 (1968).
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obvious situation of compensation for dependents in the
form of income and services, an individual has a value to
his or her employer, to the state as a citizen and taxpayer,
and to any organization he or she helps support. If
''value" is defined to include only income and services
provided to dependents, the estimation procedure is
slightly different from that used if value includes the indi-
vidual's contribution to society. One major difference is
that, in the former case, it is necessary to deduct expected
future personal taxes and personal consumption expend-
itures from expected future earnings before capitalization
to determine the actual value to be received by the depen-
dents.20 If the determination of an individual's value to
society is desired, then perhaps we should capitalize ex-
pected future gross earnings in order to estimate the
loss. 2I This result might be the case since society loses
the entire gross earnings of the individual.
The standard way of calculating economic loss is to cal-
culate the present value of the stream of benefits which
would have been received by the individual(s) suffering
the loss had the accident not occurred. 22 In what follows,
it is assumed that the accident victim was killed, and that
his or her dependents are the ones being compensated.23
20) Id.
2' See Kiker & Birkeli, Human Capital Losses Resulting from the War in Vietnam, 80J.
POL. ECON. 102 (1972).
22 See B. KIKER, AN ANALYSIS OF MONETARY Loss RESULTING FROM PERSONAL
INJURY OR DEATH, PROOF OF ECONOMIC Loss (Continuing Legal Education. Divi-
sion of the South Carolina Bar, 1980), at 46-73.
-' The economic loss to a victim's dependents can be measured by substituting
appropriate values in Equation (1):
h-I
K = Y [W,(I+V) t - I - C,(I+Q)'-']/(I+r) t-1 ]
t=I
The symbols in this equation and their interpretation are summarized in Table 1.
Although most of the variables' interpretations can be understood from this table,
several require elaboration. "W" stands for the expected gross earned income at
the date of death if the individual were gainfully employed, less personal income
taxes of the victim, plus income such as pension benefits in a base year. If the
individual was not gainfully employed, but was expected to be in the future (e.g. if
he was a student), "W" can be estimated based on what the individual most likely
would have earned had she been employed. Any "unearned income", such as
ECONOMIC ANAL YSIS
To demonstrate the use of such evaluation technique,
assume an American male, aged 35, as of 1983, receiving
the average annual salary of a worker in the executive, ad-
ministrative, and managerial class of $26,119.24 Assume
that this individual has a working life of thirty years (varia-
ble "h"), that his net earnings and personal consumption
expenditures are thought to increase by eight percent,
and that the "appropriate" discount is eight percent. As-
sume further that his personal taxes would be fifteen per-
cent of gross annual salary over his work-life expectancy
and that this individual incurs personal expenditures
("C") of about twenty-two percent of annual net earnings
annually.25 Given these assumptions, the present value of
the loss of net income less personal consumption expend-
itures to the individual's beneficiaries is $519,510.26
Although the valuation of the benefits of working indi-
viduals is quite straightforward, there are always problems
with the forecasting of future events and with determining
interest payments, is excluded, because presumably these would continue to be
received by the dependents. The victim's own personal expenditures, "C", would
not appear as benefits to the dependents. The variables "V" and "Q" are often
referred to as the "increase factors" in appraisals of economic loss in wrongful
death litigation. See Dick, Determining the Present Value of Future Income: Selecting In-
come Growth Rates, 41 J. RISK & INS. 729 (1974). Bell & Taub, Selecting Income
Growth and Discount Rates in Wrongful Death and Injury Cases: Additional Comments, 44J.
RISK & INS. 122 (1977); Smith, The Use of Inflation Factors in Determining Settlements on
Personal Injury and Death Suits, 43 J. RISK & INS. 369 (1976). The parameter "h"
denotes the probable number of years the victim would have worked. The varia-
ble "r" can be thought of as the decrease factor in determining the present mone-
tary worth of a future stream of income or services. See Edwards, Selecting the
Discount Rate in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases, 42 J. RIsK & INS. 342
(1975).
24 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1985, Washington, 1985, Table 699.
2.1 See E. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 78
(1961).
21, This solution is found by inserting the appropriate values into Equation 1,
30$519,510 = 7 [$22,201(1+.08)'-' - $4,884(l +.08)'- ]/(1 +.08)'-'
t=l
where $22,201 is 85 percent of the earnings loss in 1982 of $26,119, and t is the
appropriate time period (e.g., an age of 35 indicates a value of t of 1, age 36
indicates a value of t of 2, and so on). The sigma sign indicates summation over a
number of time periods, in this case from ages 35 through 65.
19861 595
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TABLE 1
SYMBOL EXPLANATION
K The present value of the expected future net loss to
the dependents as a result of the accident victim's
death.
W The income variable upon which the dependent's loss
is based.
V The rate of increase in earnings which the victim would
likely have experienced over his expected work life.
C The value of personal expenditures at the time of
death which would be expected to be incurred by the
individual alone.
r An appropriate rate of discount, to express future
expected benefits, in terms of a present value.
h Work life expectancy of the decedent had the accident
not occurred, measured from the time of the accident.
A Actual award received by dependents in compensation
for loss resulting from accident victim's death.
FEE Legal fees of dependents in attempting to receive
compensation.
NC Compensation to dependents net of legal fees (equal to
Actual award (A) less legal fees (FEE)).
P, Probability of a successful attempt on the part of the
plaintiffs to obtain compensation.
P Probability of an unsuccessful attempt on the part of
plaintiffs to obtain compensation.
PVNC Present value of net compensation (NC).
E(PVNC) Present value of expected (weighted average) net
compensation received.
MAX Maximum limit of compensation.
1986] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 597
a loss of value for dependents of non-working victims.2 7
B. Measures of Compensation
The compensation received by dependents may or may
not approximate the economic loss they have incurred.
The actual award received, "A", can be determined a
number of different ways. The economic value of the loss
is only one. 28 Of course, legal fees ("FEE") must be de-
ducted from A to obtain a measure of the total compensa-
tion actually realized by the dependents, ("NC").
According to a study done by Judge Peirson Hall, legal
fees in the United States average seventeen percent of the
value of settlements.2 9  If we use the slightly higher pro-
portions recommended by the Montreal Agreement, 30
27 The valuation of a housewife's services is somewhat more complex. See
Gronau, The Interfamily Allocation of Time, 6 AM. ECON. REV. 634 (1973);
Hawrylyshyn, Towards a Definition of Non-Market Activities, 23 REV. INCOME &
WEALTH 79 (1977); Hunt & Kiker, Valuation of Household Services: Methodology and
Estimation, 46J. RISK & INS. 697 (1979). Suppose the decedent is engaged only in
household production; how can the value of the loss of household services be
estimated? In estimating the loss of these services, the annual value of the serv-
ices performed by the spouse replaces "W" in Equation 1. In the formula above,
"K" now becomes the present value of expected future household services per-
formed by the individual. Three procedures are used to measure the value of
effort devoted to home production. Borrowing from economic theory, the first is
the "opportunity cost" approach. According to this approach, the value of an
additional hour of time is the same in all uses of the time, whether at work on the
job or performing household duties.
In the second procedure, the "aggregated replacement cost" approach, the to-
tal hours an individual is likely to spend in home production is determined and
then valued at the market wage for domestic help. The third and most reasonable
approach to estimating the value of household services seems to be the segrega-
tion of productive home services into categories in which separate market price
equivalents are computable, such as meal preparation, laundry work, house clean-
ing, shopping, childcare and miscellaneous activities such as general repairs. Af-
ter determining the hours devoted to these services, the price of market
substitutes for time in each of these services is used to ascertain the economic
value of home production.
It is important to point out that the decedent may have been both gainfully
employed and providing household services to his or her dependents. If so, then
both a value of lost earnings and a value of household services must be estimated
and considered in determining the present value of economic loss to dependents.
28 See, e.g., Kiker & Birkeli, supra note 21.
29 See Hall, Memorandum to M.D.L. Panel, April 28, 1978.
) Senate Report on Montreal Aviation Protocols, supra note 7 at 3.
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then with a value for A of $75,000 an amount of $58,000
would be received by the dependents. The $17,000 dif-
ference would represent legal fees. Thus legal fees would
be about twenty-three percent of the total settlement.
If cases are litigated, then the present value of NC
should be reduced because compensation is received in
subsequent years and is subject to a time discount." Ac-
cording to a Civil Aeronautics Board study, about twenty
percent of all litigated airline accident cases are settled in
each of the five years following the accident.3 2 If the aver-
age dependent received a $100,000 award three years af-
ter the accident (roughly the average settlement time), r is
eight percent, and legal fees are thirty percent of the
award, then the dependents would receive net compensa-
tion of about $55,570 when valued as of the time the loss
occurred.
The above calculations have been made under the as-
sumption that compensation is a certainty. It is true that
in specific instances, such as under strict liability, depen-
dents will almost certainly receive compensation in the
event of an accident. The imposition of strict liability on
airlines, as under the Montreal Agreement3 4 or as set out
in the Warsaw Convention, 35 is tantamount to offering
victims' dependents the certainty of compensation. This
is not the only conceivable compensation arrangement. If
fault must be established in court, then in the absence of
an out-of-court award, it its uncertain whether the victims'
dependents will receive any award at all. Moreover, even
if the dependants receive an award, the size of the settle-
3' The present value of NC ("PVNC") is expressed in equation 2, where t is the
time of settlement and r is the discount (interest) rate: PVNC = NC / (1 + r),
3' CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Levels of Recoveries on Account of Passenger Deaths and
Serious Injuries in Airplane Accidents: Aviation Protocols, Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977).
31 The present value at the time of the accident of a net award of $70,000 (that
is, a gross award of $100,000 less 30 per cent for legal fees) received three years
from the time of the accident is $70,000/(1 +.08) 3 = $55,570.
.14 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
-. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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ment is uncertain. 6 The indentification of relevant alter-
antive liability arrangements permits one to evaluate
these alternatives through the eyes of the dependents.
Once the varying probabilities of alternative outcomes
are recognized, one can develop measures of the expected
value of each alternative compensation arrangement.3 7
The value of each alternative compensation arrangement
can be expressed in terms of the probability38 of each out-
come and the value of the outcome itself. For example,
one possible compensation arrangement could provide
that, in order to obtain compensation, the victim's depen-
dents must prove carrier negligence. Under this arrange-
ment two outcomes are possible. One, where the plaintiff
is "successful" and obtains a settlement with a present
value ("PVNCs") of $80,00039 and one where the plaintiff
is unsuccessful and the settlement's present value
("PVNCn") is zero. Let us refer to the likelihood of each
separate outcome as its "probability," termed "P", with P,
referring to the probability of a successful outcome and P,,
referring to the probability of an unsuccessful outcome.
Assume that the plaintiff receives an award in half of the
cases. That is P, is .50 and Pn is .50. We can express the
overall expected award, "E(PVNC)", as the weighted av-
erage value of each outcome, with the weights being the
so See Sand, supra note 6 at 262. Sand states: "Without the Convention, com-
mon law liability rules would require the passenger to prove carrier's negligence
unless 'the case speaks for itself (res ipsa loquitur), which again could be rebutted
by the carrier." Id.
37 See Jacobs & Tompkins, A Model of the Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, 30
CPCU ANNALS 247 (1977).
38 The probability of a specific outcome is the expected number of times that it
will occur out of all the times it can occur. Thus, if there are 100 liabilty cases,
and if forty-five cases result in awards, then the probability of a case resulting in
an award is 0.45. In symbolic terms we can express the probablity as "P" with
subscript "s" for a "successful" outcome (i.e., an award received) and subscript
"n" for the outcome where no award (i.e. an award of zero value) is received. It
should be noted that if all cases result in either an award or in no award, then P,
+ Pn = 1. Or if 30% of all cases result in an award, then 70% result in no award.
For an exposition of the application of probability analysis in a similar context
see W. LUKSETICH & M. WHITE, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 117 (1982).
so The current maximum award under the Montreal Agreement is $58,000. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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probability of each outcome occurring.40
Assume that average compensation received in each
successful suit is $80,000 but that only one half of all suits
result in awards (i.e., P s .50). Now, since no single
plaintiff knows before the fact whether his case will be one
of the successful ones, then each plaintiff has an expected
value of compensation of $40,000.11
It must be remembered that the above example was de-
veloped in the context of a specific set of numbers that
correspond to a single set of liability arrangements. But
with this framework, it becomes possible to compare the
expected compensations among alternative liability ar-
rangements. Let us now look at how a set of strict liability
arrangements would compare. Under strict liability the
victim's dependents are certain of an award; that is, the
value of Ps is 1 and the value of P, is 0. If the average
value of the award were the same as the Montreal Agree-
ment maximum ($58,000), then the expected value of
compensation to the dependents would be $58,000.42
The actual compensation to those who do receive com-
pensation under a strict liability system could in fact be
much less than under an alternative system, yet the ex-
pected compensation could be greater.
C. A Maximum Award
A maximum award, "MAX", is a ceiling or limit on an
award. In Article 22A of the Warsaw Convention one
such limit is proposed. The prime beneficiaries of such
limits are the airlines and insurance companies. It should
not be inferred that such limits necessarily hurt plaintiffs
on average. Accompanying such limits may be increases
in the probability of receiving such an award (as in the
4o This is shown symbolically in equation 3: E(PVNC) = P, X PVNC., + (1 -
P) X PVNC n.
41 This is calculated, using Equation 3, supra note 40 as [(.5 (80,000) + (.5)(0)]
= 40,000.
42 This is calculated as [(1) (58,000) + (58,000)(0)] = 58,000.
4.4 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22(1).
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case of strict liability under the Warsaw Agreement),44
and more prompt settlements. This may mean larger ex-
pected values of compensation, because of the increased
probability and promptness of receiving an award, and
because of lower legal fees.
It is not our concern here with whether or not a maxi-
mum should be instituted. We are concerned only with
the economic implications of any particular maximum
award. We believe that a maximum should have an ex-
plicit economic basis. This would better enable one to
evaluate it in terms of its fairness in compensating depen-
dents for actual economic losses.
One such basis, which appears to be grounded in Amer-
ican policy proposals,4 5 is that any maximum award
should fully cover the losses46 of eighty per cent of all
beneficiaries. That is, that the value of MAX should be
equal or exceed the value of PVNC for eighty per cent of
the potential victims.
The selection of any single limit means that certain de-
pendents will be precluded from the full economic value
of losses. Those dependents whose losses exceed the
maximum ("MAX") will, if compensated at a level of the
maximum, be undercompensated by an amount equal to
the difference between their loss and the maximum. If the
maximum were set at $58,000, a dependent who suffers
losses valued at $258,000 would be undercompensated by
44 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
45 See Protocol to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1977) (statement of
Elias Saad and John R. Benn):
[The] second set of data represents the recovery levels that satisfied
eighty per cent of all death and injury claims from 1966 through
1974. We selected this second group of figures based upon a policy
consideration long espoused by CAB and state department. As early
as the Montreal conference of 1966 our government has stated that
any limit on air carrier liability was unacceptable unless eighty per-
cent of the affected claims could be satisfied within that limit.
Id.
46 Our proposal is in terms of losses, not claims. There may not be any corre-
spondence between claims and settlement, on the one hand, and losses, on the
other.
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$200,000, if he received the maximum award. It appears
reasonable that the selection of a maximum should be
based on how many such dependents would be precluded
from full compensation.
Based on airline passenger survey data, and using the
techniques of loss estimation outlined in Section IIA of
this article, we estimated the distribution of the size of the
potential loss for United States airline passengers in
1983. 4 7 The results of these estimates are shown graphi-
47 The information used to derive Figure 1 was gleaned from a survey con-
ducted in 1984 for the Air Transport Association of America ("ATA") to obtain
information about the incidence of flying on commercial airlines among a sample
of the nation's adult population. 1984 Air Travel Survey, conducted by the Gal-
lup Organization for the Air Transport Association of America, Washington, DC;
9, 10, 20, 21. Columns (1) and (2) below contain information on the proportion
of the adult population that had flown within the last year on a commercial airline
by family income intervals. Column (3) gives the midpoint of the income inter-
vals. The mid-point of the open ended category is assumed to be $50,000. Col-
umn (4) shows the total number of individuals out of 1,000 surveyed who were in
the income interval. The number of the sample of 1,000 in the adult population
who had flown in the last year (Column (1) X Column (4)) is given in Column (5).
The numbers in Column (5) are converted to proportions and are presented in
Column (6). The proportions in Column (6) can be interpreted as the percent of
those who fly on commercial airlines whose family income is in the particular in-
come interval. For example, 27 percent of all airline passengers can be thought to
have a family income between $25,000 and $39,000; 7 percent report income
within the $5,000 - $9,999 interval. The midpoint of the income interval can be
taken as an estimate of the gross income of a passenger within the income
interval.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. 49% $40,000 and over $50,000 160 78 32%
2. 31% 25,000 - 39,999 32,500 216 67 27%
3. 28% 20,000 - 24,999 22,500 100 28 11%
4. 20% 15,000- 19,999 17,500 160 30 10%
5. 19% 10,000 - 14,999 12,500 160 30 12%
6. 13% 5,000- 9,999 7,500 121 16 7%
244 99%
Column (7) shows the mid-point ages of those who had flown during the past year
by income intervals deduced from data taken from the ATA Air Travel Survey.
The numbers in Column (8) are remaining work-life estimates assuming a normal
retirement age of 65 years. The mid-point income level and the remaining appro-
priate work-life estimates provide information for estimates of lost gross earnings
over the work-life for an individual who earns that mid-point income and is killed
in an airline accident. For example, individuals in the income level of $25,000 -
$39,999 could be assumed to earn $32,500 annually and have a work-life expec-
tancy of 23 additional years. We can assume further that 27 percent of the victims
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cally in Figure 1. In this figure we plotted the percent of
passengers with potential losses at or below given
amounts against potential values of losses (in thousands
of dollars). According to our estimates, ten percent of all
in any airline accident earn $32,000. If personal income taxes and personal con-
sumption expenditures are assumed to follow the schedules presented in Col-
umns (9) and (10) respectively, the net income that could have been available to
dependents of individuals in the income intervals is given in Column (11). These
personal income tax and personal consumption expenditure percentages are real-
istic for married individuals with two dependents in the upper income intervals.
Of course, the low income intervals would not support a family of four. Keep in
mind that the personal expenditure estimate is how much the decedent is thought
to spend on himself personally, with all family expenditures such as housing, au-
tomobile, food, remaining the same.
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1. 55 10 23.5% 18% $31,365 $313,650
2. 42 23 16.8 22 22,091 485,093
3. 29 36 10.6 26 14,885 535,860
4. 21 44 8.2 26 11,888 523,072
5. 21 44 5.0 38 7,363 323,972
6. 21 44 - 60 3,000 132,000
Column (12) gives the present value of the net income estimate shown in Column
(11) projected to the end of the work-life shown in Column (8), with the assump-
tion that the rate of growth of earnings over the work-life just equals the interest
rate used to discount the future income stream to the present.
From Columns (6) and (12) the following schedule of economic losses by per-
centage of decedents incurring the losses can be deduced:







Based on this schedule, we estimated a smoothed out version using a statistical
regression analysis, with the percent of passengers expressed as a function of the
square of the loss value. This smoothed out verson is displayed in Figure 1; some
critical values of this version appear below:
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dependents of passengers would suffer losses of $72,000
or less in the event of death; 20 percent would suffer
losses of $196,000 or less; and so on.
FIGURE 1
Percent of passengers with potential
losses at or below a given amount
1.00 200 300 400 500 600
VALUE OF LOSSES ($,THOUSANDS)
It can be seen that, according to these estimates, a max-
imum compensation of $58,000 would fully cover under
10% of dependents' losses. One of $300,000 would fully
cover between thirty and forty percent of dependents'
losses and leave the other sixty percent to seventy percent
undercompensated. If the eighty percent rule were fol-
lowed,4" a limit of $488,000 should be set.
It should be emphasized that these are estimates and
'" See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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not actual figures. They are presented as a first approxi-
mation of the data which should be used in establishing a
maximum. Surveys can be used to gather information to
allow a more accurate approximation of potential loss dis-
tributions by passengers. Based on these estimates, the
United States government (in this case) can establish that
maximum award which explicitly meets its target levels for
full compensation. Much of the arbitrariness which is now
present in discussions concerning the appropriate maxi-
mum would be avoided.
III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF LIABILITY
ARRANGEMENTS
There is a considerable difference between nations in
average income levels and there is very likely a difference
in income levels between residents or citizens of different
nations who take international flights. In Table 2 we pres-
ent data on "K", the expected economic loss of decedents
who have 30 years remaining in the work force (24 in the
case of the Central African Republic to account for lower
life expectancies in this state), who are earning the aver-
age wage of a manufacturing employee in their state in
terms of 1977 local monetary units, and who worked a full
year.49
What is striking about these figures is the considerable
variation between averages among states, ranging from
about $11,000 for the Central African Republic to
$267,00 for the United States. Values of economic losses
for other countries fall along the spectrum, and cannot
easily be grouped in a non-arbitrary fashion.
While we have no data on potential losses of interna-
tional airline passengers from different countries, it is
likely that such differences exist, though they are not
- It was assumed that taxes and personal consumption reduced "K" below
gross earned income by about twenty-five percent. These figures were translated
into United States dollar terms using 1977 currency conversion rates. Rates of
growth in net income ("V"), and personal consumption expenditures ("Q'), the
increase factors, are assumed to equal the discount rate ("r"), the decrease factor.
1986] 605
606 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [5
TABLE 2
Values of economic Losses to dependents of manufac-





























Source: Annual income for 1977 for manufacturing industries from
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS 1980.
Average life expectancy from UNITED NATIONS DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1979
Table 5. A value for working years remaining of 30 assumed except for Central
African Republic, for which a figure of 24 was used. Conversion to US dollars
based on 1977 average market exchange rates obtained from INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 1980.
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likely to be pronounced since there will be smaller pro-
portion of residents who are international passengers in
poorer nations.
Indeed, the international aviation law community has
come to recognize the fact that such differences should be
incorporated into the international compensation picture.
The inclusion of domestic supplements in the Warsaw
agreement, 50 along with the recognition that such supple-
ments may vary among nations, is tantamount to the al-
lowance for different maximums into a package that was
once uniform.
From the viewpoint of economics, a variation in maxi-
mums among nations would make sense. For example,
assume the passengers who are residents or nationals of
Mexico had a distribution of potential losses that was very
similar in shape to that of United States passengers, but
was (allowing for some income difference) uniformly
lower by 50%. In this case, the value of losses at each
percentage point for the Mexican passengers would be 50
percent lower than for the United States passengers. If
the Mexican government also chose an 80 percent cut off
point,5 1 then it would choose a maximum of $244,000
(half of the value which the United States government
would choose).
More importantly, the existence of such differences in
potential losses between countries, along with the ex-
tended period it has taken the international aviation legal
community to respond to changes in price levels, has led
to the inability of the American government to overcome
objections from elements of the legal community and
adopt the amendments. One approach to overcome these
objections would be to adopt an alternative maximum
formula with enough flexibility to allow individual coun-
tries to set maximums that would be acceptable to their
government.
• See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
51 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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IV. AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO COMPENSATION
The primary objective of this article is to propose a
compensation scheme that will allow equitable awards to
dependents of victims of international airline accidents.
Given the background of liability rules under the Warsaw
Convention, the economic rationale for proper compen-
sation in wrongful death litigation, and the international
aspects of the current arrangements, we believe a com-
pensation scheme should have the following objectives.
First, it should provide compensation which bears some
relationship to the economic losses actually suffered. Sec-
ond, it should be easily implemented. Third, it should be
relatively unambiguous, so that maximum values can be
determined without a great deal of controversy. Fourth, it
should be flexible, so that it can accommodate changes
such as inflation and the values of foreign currencies.
With these objectives in mind, we propose that, instead of
searching for a single number which will be applicable to
residents of all countries, a general procedure be imple-
mented which can be adhered to by the courts of all states
when awarding compensation.
According to our proposed procedure, each govern-
ment would be responsible for setting its own maximum
liability level, which would be binding for residents or citi-
zens of that country. The maximum should be based on
a loss evaluation formula5 3 (such as the one presented in
this article) so that there would be an established relation-
ship between actual losses and compensation.
The information needed for the implementation of this
procedure would come from income surveys of citizens of
each country who take international flights. Such surveys
The determination as to an individual's residence or citizenship would be left
to the courts.
r':' It should be stressed that this proposal is concerned with the distribution of
losses and the relationship of awards to these losses. Current discussion focuses
solely on the distribution of awards while paying little or no attention to the losses
for which the awards are made. See SENATE REPORT ON MONTREAL AVIATION PRO-
"rocoLs, supra note 7.
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could be conducted periodically (e.g., every two to five
years) and could be done on a sample basis. Information
gathered would include data such as age and income of a
sample of international passengers who are residents of
given countries. Based on this data, an estimate could be
made of the distribution of losses of all potential passen-
gers who are citizens or residents of a particular nation.
This loss data could be reported in the currency of the
nation of which the passengers are citizens or residents.
A cut off point, such as the eighty per cent cut off point
used in our example, would be chosen (perhaps even
agreed upon internationally). Based upon the potential
distribution of losses, and the cut off point selected, a
maximum award pertaining to the citizens or residents of
each country could be established. For example, if the
data presented in Section III were used for the United
States, then a maximum award of $488,000 would be se-
lected for United States citizens and residents.
There are a number of benefits of such a system of set-
ting a maximum. First, the award would be made in the
currency of the nation of which the individual was a citi-
zen or resident. This is the currency in terms of which
losses are incurred. There would be no need to seek out a
single international currency whose constantly fluctuating
value would create added problems. Second, the living
standard differences among passengers of different coun-
tries would be fully accounted for in the surveys, and a
major source of controversy would be eliminated. Third,
the maximum award could be updated regularly, either by
conducting new surveys or by forecasting changes in the
cost of living. The lag between changing living standards
and the maximum award could be reduced considerably.
Fourth, the maximum award would be based on actual
data and judgements. The areas of controversy could be
more explicitly brought out, and decisions may be
reached more quickly.
It may well be that because of favorable liability rules
(e.g., strict liability), early settlements, and thus low legal
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fees, some adjustment might be made to lower the value
of the maximum ("MAX") award, to take into account the
fact that net benefits to the victims' dependents are
greater under the proposed system. Such adjustments
would be well within the spirit of our approach, but would
recognize that the proposed system "economizes" on
legal services.
IV. SUMMARY
The present system of international airline accident vic-
tim compensation, while attempting to reach the peak of
simplicity, has become a tangled web. The attempt to de-
velop a single maximum for all liabilities has created sev-
eral insurmountable difficulties. First, because currencies
fluctuate in terms of each other, there will always be losers
(and gainers) when expressing awards in terms of any sin-
gle currency. Second, because of the vast differences in
incomes among nations, a single maximum could result in
unfair limitations on awards to victims in high income na-
tions. And third, because incomes (and therefore losses)
have changed in value over time, there have been periods
when the maximum award has precluded a considerable
number of victims for receiving equitable compensation.
In this article, we have proposed an alternative arrange-
ment, based on the belief that the award should bear
some relationship to the actual economic loss incurred.
According to our proposal, losses would be evaluated in
terms of a standard procedure, which would recognize
differences within as well as between countries. Compen-
sation would bear some relationship to these losses, with
appropriate recognition for the speed of settlement, the
certainty of settlement, and the effect of these two vari-
ables on legal fees. If a maximum award is desired, then
such a maximum should be calculated with explicit refer-
ence to the number of potential victims' dependents who
will be excluded from full compensation for their eco-
nomic losses. Consideration of such a scheme would
move the entire debate on compensation for economic
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losses in airline accidents into the area of what an appro-
priate settlement is, rather than in looking for a somewhat
elusive single maximum.

